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A communication network is composed of communication links and
processing nodes. The effective design of a survivable communication
network requires a means of determining the structural connectivity of the
network both as a whole and with respect to individual resources: links and
nodes. In this thesis we represent the connectivity evaluation from two
perspectives. The first pertains to considerations applicable to the design
schema of the network, and the second deals with an improvement of
connectivity in an existing network. We then present and analyze a practical
synthetic approach to a communications network's survivability profile by
using the example of SACS (the Saudi Arabian Communication System).
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The intention of this thesis is to identify and analyze the essential
components that contribute to, and produce as the sum of their
interrelationship, a profile or quotient of survivability for high-tech military
communications networks that will be able to encounter an adversary of
roughly equivalent characteristics. In doing so, we hope that we may
contribute to a developing theory of survivability that allows systems
designers to approach their task with a greater degree of clarity than is
currently the case.
B. BACKGROUND
A given military communications network should be able to function
along a continuum that extends from the low-stress nature of peacetime to
one of intense hostility in the onslaught of full battle engagement. At the
peacetime end of the continuum, processing and operations functions are
generally considered to be of the greatest importance. In battle, essential
functions are compressed into the ability to effect command and control
communications under hostile conditions. Of course, both of the above
functions are employed at any point along the continuum.
As a general characteristic, we should note that all of the military
networks which have access to current electronic technology display an
evident progression toward greater complexity. A case in point may be
observed through a simple comparison of traditional telephone systems to
those currently employed, wherein entire sets of complex and elaborate data
are often transmitted over the same modalities simultaneously; still more
options are available with the use of either fixed or mobile access.
If a system's functions do not reflect a rigorous application of design and
planning, by which alternate routing and the expansion of capabilities are
strategically planned, the result may be vulnerability as a by-product of the
ever-increasing complexity of an integrated multi-functional network. Yet
our reliance upon communications systems has increased along with their
complexity.
Since World War I, there has been a virtually exponential acceleration in
the lethality of weaponry and the techniques of mobile deployment. This
acceleration parallels technological applications of scientific advancement, e.g.
machine guns, poison gas, guided missiles, and so on. The resulting
combination of greatly enhanced destructive capability and mobility means
that lethality may also be accelerated relative to historically prevailing
conditions.
The logistical, tactical, and strategic functions of a military unit must be
coordinated vis-a-vis the command and control apparatus in order to achieve
its goals and potentials. The communications network of that unit is of
paramount importance: it represents the physical and electronic
transmission and reception of orders by command and control. Thus the
capability of a communications network to reconfigure and continue
operations within a modern warfare environment is essential to the
functioning of the command and control center as a whole.
In light of the previous statements, it is important to note that most of
the approaches employed in modern network design are weighted toward
specific processing, performance, and cost requirements as their working
parameters, rather than a rigorous schematic analysis of basic node and link
connections. Under these parameters, systems have been developed in the
past which have impressive optimized high processing capabilities, but low
quotients of survivability.
C SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION
We will begin the process of identification and analysis by examining and
assessing the substance of connectivity theory (Chapter II). With this
approach, we evaluate survivability in terms of a composite measure of how
well nodes and links contribute to network configuration. Since the issue of
connectivity and its measure is significant in all of the components we will
examine, our treatment shall attempt to be as exhaustive and as definitive as
possible.
Chapter III will examine a process of enhancing the application of the
connectivity measure through the aggregation of additional links, based on
their economic utility.
The third part of our data presentation, Chapter IV, will consist of an
analysis of the communications network currently being put into use in
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi system has been designed assuming a "worst-case"
scenario (in other words, that end of the continuum which we described as
"full battle engagement"). As such, it incorporates a number of features
which are particularly pertinent to our discussion and purpose. At the end of
Chapter IV, we shall attempt to establish a relationship between the essential




In the past, military networks have been designed primarily to meet
specific organizational and operational requirements. The organizational
hierarchy is usually the basis for the network's interconnection structure, and
various operational requirements dictate any modifications and/or additions.
The communications links follow operational reporting requirements.
Limited (if any) alternate routing capability is available. A problem with this
type of network is its poor survivability.
The effective design of survivable communication networks requires a
means of accurately evaluating their structural connectivity [Ref. 2:p. 4]. In
this chapter we will employ two methods for the network connectivity
evaluation. The first approach is based upon the graphic connectivity
parameters, namely edge connectivity and vertex connectivity [Ref. l:p. 60].
The second approach is an extension of the first method, with the process
involving multiple stages of network decomposition [Ref. 2:p. 3]. This
approach quantifies the connectivity by four parameters: NCF (node
connectivity factor) and LCF (link connectivity factor) as global measures, and
NDI (node decomposition index) and LTI (link tree index) as local
connectivity measures which give the individual link/node contribution to
the network structures' survivability.
1. Connectivity Evaluation
The first step in the evaluation of a network's connectivity is the
conversion of that network to graphic form, which is composed of edges
(link) and nodes (vertex). The graph is commonly represented by G = (N,E)
where N is a set of vertices and E is a set of edges (links). The graph G is said
to be "connected" if there is at least one path between every pair of the nodes
in G [Ref. 3:p. 60]. Furthermore, G is said to be "completely connected" if
there exists a unique edge (link) between each pair of the nodes in the set N of
G. A graph is said to be "disconnected" if it consists of two or more disjoint
subgraphs G^, such that G = Gi u G2, ..., Gn (implying N = Ni u N2, ..., u Nn ,
E = Ei u E2 , ..., u Em and Gk <^ G\ is empty for all k,j. By definition, each of
these subgraphs of G is to be termed a "component" of the disconnected graph
G. Two additional concepts, cut-vertex sets and spanning trees, are also of
direct importance to the connectivity of Graph G. A node (or vertex) of a
connected graph G is said to be a "cut-vertex" at G if and only if its removal
from G (along with any edges connected to it) will cause the G to become
disconnected. Furthermore, a "minimum cut-vertex set" of G represents the
minimum number of nodes and associated edges that must be removed from
G to make it a disconnected graph [Ref. l:p. 75]. A "spanning tree" T of a
connected graph G is defined to be a minimum set of edges in G that connect
all nodes within the graph without forming any closed paths from a given
node back to itself.
• The connectivity [Ref. l:p. 78] of graph G is measured by two
parameters called the edge connectivity and vertex connectivity
parameters, defined as follows:
• • The edge connectivity of a connected graph is defined as the
minimum number of edges whose removal reduces the rank of
the graph by one where the rank of the connected graph is defined
as[Refl:p. 72]:
rank r = n -k
n is the number of vertices in G.
k is the number of G's components. If K = 1, G is connected.
•• Vertex connectivity is the minimum number of vertices whose
removal from G leaves the remaining graph disconnected.
For example, the graph G shown in Figure 2-1 consists of six
vertices and nine edges. From the graph shown in Figure 2-1 we see that the
minimum edges whose removal causes a disconnected graph are edges (a,b)
or (h, k). Therefore the edge connectivity is 2. For the vertex connectivity, we
see that the removal of N2 and N3 or N4 and N5 causes G to be disconnected.
Thus the vertex connectivity is 2 in this case as well.
AT,
Figure 2-1. Fundamental Cut-Sets of Graph
We can ascertain if the graph is separable by utilizing graph theory.
Definition [Ref. 3:p. 68]
Separable Graph: A connected graph is said to be separable if its vertex
connectivity is one.
Suppose we are given n stations that are to be connected by e links where
e>n-\. What is the best way of connecting the network so that the network
is invulnerable to the destruction of individual stations and individual
links? We construct a graph with n vertices and e edges that has the
maximum connectivity edge and vertex, since the edge and vertex
connectivity are the minimum number of edges or vertices whose removal
causes a disconnected graph.
For example, given n = 8 and e = 16, we can have a graph as shown in
Figure 2-2, which has an edge connectivity of three and a vertex connectivity
of one.
Figure 2-2. Separable Graph
But if we configure the graph as in Figure 2-3, we will have edge and vertex
connectivities equal to four and consequently, even after any three stations or
three links are destroyed, the remaining stations can still communicate with
each other.
Thus Figure 2-3 is better connected than that of Figure 2-2. From graph
theory [Ref. l:p. 65], we see that the highest connectivity we can get is limited
to the following equations:
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vertex connectivity < edge connectivity < —
2e
Max vertex connectivity = —
Applying these equations to the preceding example, the maximum vertex
(le 2*16\
connectivity = ~ = q I The preceding approach equates the network
connectivity to the likelihood of maintaining communication either between
selected node-pairs or until the first occurrence of network disruption due to
critical node and /or link losses.
Figure 2-3. Graph with Eight Vertices and 16 Links
The second method is an extension of the above results in equating
connectivity quantification to a process involving multiple stages of network
decomposition resulting from the loss of link and /or node resources.
The connectivity evaluation of network is quantified for the network
both as a whole and with respect to its individual resources (node/ link).
Global Connectivity Measure
The overall connectivity level of a network may be quantified by a pair of
factors: the node connectivity factor (NCF) and the link connectivity factor
(LCF) [Ref. 10:p. 5].
The NCF represents the physical stability of a network in terms of the
average number of nodes that must be destroyed in order to force its
remaining nodes into a stand-alone configuration. Calculation of the NCF is
begun by first determining all possible sequences of critical cut-vertex set
removals that could lead to a completely disconnected state. The likelihoods
of each of these decomposition sequences occurring, along with the total
number of critical nodes removed, are then combined. The NCF calculation
is outlined in the following steps:
1. Determine the minimum cut-vertex sets for the first component of
graph G.
2. Determine the likelihood of occurrence for each potential cut-vertex
set.
3. Generate subgraphs resulting from the removal of each possible cut-
vertex set and their associated links.
4. Determine if the resulting subgraphs are completely disconnected.
Repeat steps 1-3 for those subgraphs which are still partially connected.
5. Compute the component NCF.
6. Repeat steps 1-5 for each component of graph G.
7. Compute the composite NCF from component NCFs by summing.
The above procedure produces a decomposition diagram for each
component of graph G (if the network is not represented as a single graph).
The decomposition diagram represents all possible sequences of cut vertex set
losses that could result in the complete disconnection of the component.
The computation of the component NCF from this decomposition
diagram is defined by the following equation:
Nt
NCF. = ^NjP[Nj) (1)
10
where
NCF, = NCF associated with component i of graph G
Nj = Number of nodes removed for the jth decomposition path
P(Nj) = Likelihood of the jth decomposition path occurring
Nt = Total paths or leaves formed in the component decomposition
tree diagram
The overall NCF for the network is then computed by summation of the
individual NCFs for each component.
The LCF represents the electronic stability of the network in terms of the
average contribution of each link to maintaining a minimally connected
configuration. Calculation of the LCF is begun by determining the total
number of spanning trees contained in each component of the network
graph. From this the average contribution of any given link to the total
number of spanning trees can be calculated. The contribution of each
component to the overall network LCF is then determined. The procedure
for calculating the LCF of a network involves the following steps:
1. Compute the total number of spanning trees, T, for the first component
of graph G.
2. Compute the total number of spanning tree branches in the
component by multiplying by (A/-1), where N equals the number of
nodes in the component. [Note that (N-l) represents the minimum
number of links needed to connect the nodes of the component, i.e.,
the minimum spanning tree.]
3. Compute the average number of spanning trees in the component to
which each link in the component contributes by dividing T(N-l) by
the total number of links in the component (E). [This represents the
component LCF.]
4. Repeat the first three steps for each component of graph G.
5. Compute the overall LCF for the network by summing individual
component LCFs, each weighted by a proportionality factor, S[/S, that
accounts for the component's relative contribution to the network's
overall link connectivity.
11
Calculation of the composite LCF for the network is defined by the following
equation:










LCF, = LCF for component i
Si = Number of edges in a spanning tree for component i
= Number of edges in a spanning tree for graph G
= Number of spanning trees in component i
= Number of edge in component i
= Number of nodes in component i
= Number of components
Example: given the graph G shown in Figure 2-4, find the global connectivity






Figure 2-4. Graphic Representation of the Network
First of all, the graph G has one component, since the it consists of a
single connected graph. In this example, one individual component
NCF will be computed to form the overall NCF for Graph G.
The NCF computation procedure generates the decomposition diagram
shown in Figure 2-5, as seen at level Lq. Either of the two possible
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minimal cut-vertex sets, (2,5) or (2,3), can be disconnected. Removal of
these sets results in two possible subgraphs at level Li.
Ifl
L2
Figure 2-5. Decomposition Diagram
For this example, the likelihood of occurrence for each of the subgraphs
has been assigned a value of .50, representing an equal likelihood of
each occurring.
Both of the subgraphs of level Li are now further decomposable,
resulting in a set of four possible subgraphs, shown as Level L2. At this
point it can be noted that all of the subgraphs generated for Level L2 are
completely disconnected, defining the end of decomposition diagram.
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• Each path in the decomposition diagram from Lo to level L2 represents
one possible sequence for the complete disconnection of the nodes.
• Each decomposition sequence can be evaluated to determine the total
number of nodes that must be removed to cause this disconnection
and the overall likelihood of its occurrence.
• For this example, each sequence requires the loss of three nodes and
has a likelihood of occurrence of 0.25, resulting in the following NCF
calculation for G, using Equation 1:
4
;=i
= 3(. 25) + 3(. 25) + 3(. 25) + 3(. 25)
= 3




Since the graph has but a single component, <r = 1. Tj is the total number
of spanning trees in the graph, as determined by the following method [Ref.
l:p. 58]. We start with spanning tree Ti (a,b,c,d) formed from graph G. Then
add a chord (say h, to the tree T] as shown in Figure 2-7), forming a
fundamental circuit. Removal of any branch from the fundamental circuit
will create a new spanning tree, T2. This generation of one spanning tree
from another, through addition of a chord and deletion of an appropriate
branch, is called a cyclic interchange.
14
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C W ^ h ^ ^ h ^
T T2 T3
Figure 2-7. Graph and Three of its Spanning Trees
Applying the previous procedure to our example, we find the total number of
Si




The individual values assigned to each node and link determine
the best network structure to generate. The importance of these individual
nodes and links is quantified through the node-decomposition index (NDI)
and link tree index (LTI) [Ref. ll:p. 6].
An NDI for each node in a network can be determined from the
decomposition diagram generated during the computation of the global NCF
value. A computation of the exact number of appearances of a given node in




Figure 2-8. Total Number of Spanning Trees in the Graph G
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computation provides a measure of the relative importance of each node to
the network's connectivity by determining the degree to which that node
contributes to the network decomposition process. The degree to which a
given node contributes to the decomposition process is related to the total
number of decomposition paths in which it occurs. Since Nj can vary from
path to path, the percentage contribution Cj of a node n to paths of length Kj
in the decomposition tree is weighted by the cumulative likelihood Wj. Kj is
the number of different lengths of paths. For example, in Figure 2-9, kj = 1
since all paths have length 2. The summation of these weighted
contributions for all unique path lengths K, produces a node decomposition
index of node n, defined as ND(rz) = ^. C"VVj where
m = number of unique path lengths Kj
C- = percentage of decomposition paths of length kj containing node n
Wj = cumulative likelihood of a path of length Kj occurring.
Example: to determine the NDI (node decomposition index) for the previous
example. The decomposition diagram is shown in Figure 2-9.
[2,3] / >v [2,5]
/0.5 o.s\
.5 /\ "5
/ [5] \ [4]
.5 /\.5
Pi/ \m
4 5 1 3
Figure 2-9. The Graph Decomposition Diagram
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From Figure 2-9 we see that we have four paths of length 2; the total number
of nodes in each path is 3; and we have one unique path length 2. Combining
the P(Nj)s for each of the 3-node paths results in a cumulative likelihood
weight Wi = 0.25 -4 = 1.
Next, the percentage contribution Cj of a node n must be
computed for each path of length 2. For example, node N2 occurs in all four
paths of length 2, resulting in:
1 4
Substituting the cumulative likelihood weights and the node percentage
contributions into the ND(n) equation:
ND(N2 ) = C^2 -W1 = 1-1 = 1




ND(Nl) = I. 1 = I.
Similarly, ND(N4) = 4 , and ND(N3 ) = ND(N5 ) =- • 1 = -.
Note that the maximum ND value for a node is 1. A higher ND
value indicates the higher importance of that node. The LT index for a link j
has been defined to represent that link's proportional contribution to the total




LT(J) = link tree index associated with link j
Tj = number of spanning trees containing link j
T s = total number of spanning trees.
Determination of an LT index for a given link is performed by
first removing the link from the network and computing the number of
spanning trees in the remaining network. The difference between the initial
number of spanning trees and those remaining after removal of the link
represents the number of spanning trees to which that link contributes.
For example, from the computation of LCF we know the total
number of spanning trees. The total number of spanning trees for the graph
shown in Figure 2-10 is equal to 21. Now, if we remove link a, i.e., Figure 2-
11(b), we find the total number of spanning trees in the remaining graph is
equal to 8. Thus the number of spanning trees to which that link contributes












i h 1 i
. _N
>%
h * h •
(a) (b)
Figure 2-11. (a)—The Structure Before Removing any Links; (b)—After
Moving a Link
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We can determine the other link tree indices using a similar method. The
connectivity values for the example we examined are shown in Table 2-1.
TABLE 2-1. CONNECTIVITY VALUES
NCF = 3 LCF = 12
n ND(N)
J LT(J)
Ni 1/4 a .619
N2 1 b .619
N3 3/4 c .714
N4 1/4 d .714
N5 3/4 e .619
8 .619
h .714
Figure 2-12 displays the same information as Table 2-1: the ND and LT indices
computed for the example. The ND indices indicate that N2 is the most
critical node for the topological survivability of the network. In contrast, the
loss of nodes Nj or N4 would have minimal impact on network connectivity.
The LT indices indicate that the loss of links marked with c.d.h. would result
in the greatest decrease in spanning trees; thus these links would be most
likely to be targeted by the enemy.
Once the connectivity measures have been determined, the network
designer utilizes the values to generate the number of network
configurations. He attempts to optimize the global values by relocating links
with low LTIs to positions linking nodes of low NDI, repeating the process
until global values are at their highest possible level.
20
Figure 2-12. ND and LT Indices
2. Discussion
Any evaluation of the relative merits of the two approaches
represented in this chapter must focus on two factors: first, their distinctive
levels of complexity; and second, the practical limits involved in the effective
utilization of abstract models in specific applications for network objectives.
To that end, it must be kept in perspective that human factors (that is,
the ability of the cognitive process to identify, evaluate and employ such
models to reasonable advantage within an environment of hostile
engagement) ultimately become the determining factors of the limits and
applicability of a network.
The first approach discussed in this chapter could be typified as being
highly favorable in its interaction with the human factor components, in the
sense that its theoretical utilization is capable of producing a rapid and readily
21
understandable model of network connectivity. Nonetheless, the theoretical
simplicity that makes this approach easy to apply is also its greatest deficiency.
The first approach does not give specific indications of the contributive value
of each individual node /link to the overall systemic connectivity. Because of
this lack of specific indications, the first approach's operational value must
therefore be consigned to a category of limited and only general applicability.
It is favorable in regard to human factors, but deficient in terms of the power
of its theoretical projections.
The second approach is a far more powerful theoretical tool as far as
the product of its projections. Utilizing this approach is not only capable of
generating the total number of connectivity configurations within a given
system, but can also provide a value indicator for the contribution that each
individual node/link makes within the system as a whole. With this
identification of the critical or essential connections within a system, the
system can then be (A) effectively and efficiently protected by an appropriate
concentration of security around the critical connections (defensive mode) or
(B) disabled with a minimum expenditure of resources by "surgical"
destruction of the crucial node/links (offensive mode).
Taking into account the obvious theoretical superiority of the second
approach, there remain several features that render its use cumbersome and
only marginally effective when employed within realistic operative
parameters. In order for the second approach to provide meaningful results,
it must be thoroughly applied, that is, every calculation must be completely
carried out. For the NCF computation, the minimum cut must be projected
out from the likelihood of each potential cut-vertex set in order to generate
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the decomposition diagram. The LCF computation requires the
determination of the total number of spanning trees contained within the
graph. The complexity and extensiveness of both the NCF and LCF
calculations poses significant problems for thorough application as the
number of nodes grows larger.
The second approach may then be characterized as requiring
significant expertise, highly accurate data input, and sufficient time and
capacity to arrive at meaningful conclusions, especially as the number of
nodes grows larger. We shall now consider a method by which an analytical
understanding of the cost-effectiveness of internal linkage, or connectivity
and its potential enhancement, may be achieved or evaluated, an important




We shall now introduce a specific application of another factor in the
survivability profile: link enhancement. Though link enhancement is clearly
an adjunct function of connectivity, its introduction as a theme in our study
provides for a progression in our understanding of survivability from the
theoretical to the applied.
It has been definitively shown that the problem of link enhancement is
NP-complete and that BGH (Best Group Heuristic) algorithms [Ref. 13:p. 2]
can supply the same solution as the optimal algorithm in 80% of its
applications. In this chapter we will restate the algorithms and introduce an
improvement in the methodology used in the search for the optimal
solution. We shall also illustrate a method of utilizing the BGH algorithms
in which the results duplicate the optimal solution with a frequency of
occurrence greater than 80%.
B. LINEAR SEARCH ALGORITHMS
A communication network can be thought of as a graph G(N,E), where N
are the vertices (nodes) and E are the edges (links). Suppose we have a table
consisting of tuples in the form of (i, j, Cjj, pij) where i and j are the node
numbers in the network, cy is the cost to establish the link between nodes i
and node j, and the value pij is the contribution of this link enhancement.
We are attempting to find a solution for a given investment C such that Eqj<
C and Lpjj are maximized. We can describe a generic linear search algorithm
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as follows. (Step 3 will not be included in subsequent discussions, since its
application does not pertain to our objectives.)
1. Select (remove) a link from the set of candidate links; add this link to
the current network.
2. C <- X - Qj.
3. Update the network profile, i.e., compute p;j for the new network.
4. Terminate if C < Qj for all links.
5. Go to Step 1.
1. One-way Linear Search Algorithms
There are three variations of one-way linear search algorithms.
These three variations differ at Step 1 in the way they select a communication
link, producing the feasible solution sets FSc, FSp, and FSr.
To most easily apply the linear search algorithm, we first sort the
table in nondecreasing order on the value of Qj and extract the tuples with
value of Cij< C to form a feasible solution set FS. A traditional optimal
solution for the knapsack problem can be calculated by adding a field of
r ij
= Pij/ C ij to eacn tuple and sorting the list in nonincreasing order of rjj. This
new list is designated FSr, (consisting of tuples of (i, j, Qj, pij nj)). Without loss
of generality, we can assign one link number to each node pair (i, j) to be
considered. (Table 3-1 shows only the link numbers instead of node pairs.)
Thus, in subsequent discussion, the list FSr consists of tuples of (k, Ck, Pk/ i"k)
with k as the link number. Note that the value of rk effectively measures the
contribution per dollar amount. The solution is simply a selection of links
from the linear search of the list FSr until C is either exhausted or becomes
insufficient. If divisibility is allowed, this linear search algorithm, a solution
process based on rjj, gives the optimal solution for knapsack problems.
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However, this solution will not give the optimal solution in 0/1-knapsack or
link enhancement problems.
TABLE 3-1. EXAMPLE OF 20 LINKS TO BE CONNECTED AND THE
CORRESPONDING PROFIT





















From FS we can create two sorted lists, FSC and FSp . FSC is sorted by
Cij in nondecreasing order while FSp is sorted by pjj in nonincreasing order.
Similar to the linear search we have just described above, we can perform a
linear search of list FSC and select links one at a time until the budget is
exhausted or becomes insufficient. Likewise, we can do a linear search of list
FSp and obtain the selections.
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All three one-way linear search methods, i.e., based on FSr , FSC , or
FS p , are not optimal. We can easily construct examples that show their
limitations. Table 3-2 shows the lists of FSC, FSp, and FSr . Note that in FSr we
have scaled up the ratios into integers for readability at (103).
TABLE 3-2. rjQf rOp, rOj
Link Id FS C Link Id FSp Link Id FS r
3 1246 6 5276 3 3065
7 1508 8 4477 8 2784
4 1529 13 4440 7 2559
20 1578 17 4368 17 2320
8 1608 16 4224 1 2259
18 1682 1 4140 19 2247
9 1691 7 3859 20 2208
19 1711 19 3844 6 2055
2 1754 3 3819 13 2033
1 1833 10 3807 2 1999
11 1840 11 3661 11 1990
17 1883 15 3643 9 1933
12 1960 12 3560 16 1845
5 2034 2 3506 12 1816
10 2112 20 3484 10 1803
13 2184 5 3370 5 1657
15 2254 9 3269 15 1616
16 2289 14 2899 4 1511
14 2549 4 2310 18 1143
6 2568 18 1922 14 1137
1. Example
We can apply one-way linear search to the problem of Table 3-1. For
example, using FSC alone (see Table 3-2), with a budget of 7000 we can select
links {3, 7, 4, 20} and achieve a total profit of 13,472. We designate this set of
links Sc (meaning the solution set based on FSC only). The total profit that is
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obtained is designated Pc . Similarly, we can verify the following solutions: Sp
= {3, 6, 8} and Pp = 13,572, Sr = {3, 7, 8, 17} and Pr = 16,523.
C TWO-WAY AND THREE-WAY LINEAR SEARCH ALGORITHMS
In place of the one-way linear search methods described above, we can
construct a search methodology whereby decisions are arrived at through
simultaneous examination of two lists. For example, we may use FSr and FSC
in conjunction to obtain the selections. Starting the linear search separately
on these two lists, one link at a time, we can use a voting scheme to select the
proper link. Whenever we encounter a link that has been visited in FSr or
FS C we increment the counter associate with the link. When any counter
reaches a preset threshold value, e.g., 2, we then add this link to the network.
The value C is updated by subtracting the Ck of the candidate link. We
continue the linear search until the C is either exhausted or becomes
insufficient. This counting method is called a voting algorithm since each
link accumulates votes from different lists until it obtains sufficient votes.
The present threshold in two-way linear search is set at 2, since each link can
only receive a maximum vote of 2.
2. Example
In the two-way search based on FSr and FSC we obtain the solution Src
= {3, 7, 8, 20} and Prc = 15,639. Other possible methods of two-way linear search
are (FSr, FSp), and (FSC, FSp ). However, like their one-way counterparts, these
heuristics cannot provide the optimal solution to the link enhancement
problems.
To approximate the optimal solution we must add an examination of
the three lists combined (FSr,cp ) to the values produced by the one- and two-
28
way searches. Similar to a two-way search, in three-way linear searches we set
the threshold value at 2. Using the two-way and three-way search methods,
we obtain the solutions and the corresponding total profit: (1) Srp = {1, 7, 8,
17} and Prp = 16,844; (2) Spc = {3, 7, 8, 19} and Ppc = 15,999; (3) Srpc = {3, 7, 8, 19}
and PrpC = 15,999.
D. BGH— BEST OF GROUP HEURISTIC ALGORITHMS
All the heuristic algorithms discussed above can be described as "greedy"
in nature, in that each sorts the FS in a certain order and the available budget
is depleted correspondingly.
Since sorting can be done in 0(n log n) time, we can achieve our solution
in 0(n log n) time. There is, however, no single algorithm that can be shown
to consistently produce superior results or outperform the others. Taking this
limitation into account necessitates viewing the problem from the
perspective of set selection. For instance, we may compute seven sets of
solutions, using the algorithms in question, and the simply select the
solution from the group that arrived at the greatest value. This process is
applied to the data illustrated in Table 3-1, wherein Srp provides the solution
of greatest value for Prp = 16,844. The other solutions of the group, Sr/ SC/ Sp ,
Src, Spc and Srpc , may then be disregarded. The "best" solution of the group is
then designated as the BGH.
Unfortunately, the BGH does not and cannot arrive at the value that the
optimal solution provides (the optimal solution of Table 3-1 is Sopt = (3, 6, 7, 8}
with Popt = 17,431). At a relatively high rate of occurrence, however, the BGH
can attain a value that reaches or exceeds approximately 96.6% of the optimal
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solution (as in this example when BGH is 16,844 compared to an optimal
solution of 17,431.)
Yang summarizes a set of test results where a sufficient number of cases
were randomly generated so that C^ and Pj< are independent and normally
distributed [Ref. 13:p. 8]. A statistical comparison of the BGH solutions and
the optimal solutions shows that the BGH solutions near or approximate the
optimal solutions so that any distinctions are statistically insignificant in 80%
of the cases.
E IMPROVEMENT TO THE BGH
The improvement alluded to in the introduction consists of a two-part
process though each part in and of itself represents a potentially significant
improvement to the solution and selection methodologies currently
employed.
The first part results from the introduction of an idea and method by
which the area of search for the optimal solution is reduced. The imposition
of limitations on the search procedure enables a better use of allocations
within a given budget while avoiding significant deterioration of end
solutions. Employment of this method defines the range of set exclusion as
being any set where the sum of the cost of exploration is lower than the given
investment or exceeds the given investment. The utilization of this maxim
allows us to expend a given budget so that the range of search for possible sets
of links in combinations yields the maximum profit (as previously defined).
budget
• The upper limit (UL) = . \-, , where the budget is the given
investment and min (Ck) is the minimum link cost.
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budget
• The lower limit is defined by (LL) = ——
—
(r v where max (Cj<) is themax kv-K/
maximum link cost.
The reduced search range for problem size n will always be less than 2n of
possible sets and the exact parameters of exclusion will be determined by the
quantity of the given budget.
Using the limited set search method described above, we were able to
reduce the time frame of a search in the sets of the optimal solution
algorithm 220 by more than 38% in the case of Table 3-1. The first search,
conducted without the constraints of limitation, required 48 hours of PC/AT
time before the correct set discovery was accomplished. The second search,
conducted as a limited range search on the same PC/AT, accomplished the
correct set result in 27 hours. A simple comparison of area shows that the
20 20 20
reduction diminished from an original of 220 to an area of only C 6 + C5 + C 4
20 20
+ C3 + C2 , since UL = 6 and LL = 2 for Table 3-1.
The second part of the improvement process displays a methodology
wherein the area of search is reduced much further by utilizing the concept of
limited range search. This search acts upon the set of most preferred
candidates produced by the BGH solution, the best of the set of one-way, two-
way, and three-way searches, which produces a minimum threshold of 80%
maximum profit. We then construct a table displaying costs and profit that is
comprised solely of the set union of the first sample. The limited range
reduction maxim is then applied to the existing sets, followed by the
application of the optimal solution algorithm (exhaustive search) to the
refined sets.
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Since each of the sets now undergoing exploration has an 80% basal
probability of providing the correct solution and the gross number of sets
undergoing exploration has been dramatically reduced, the search should
conclude its exploration in a highly condensed manner.
Example.
The following results were collected from Table 3-1.
FSC = {3, 7, 4, 20}, Pc = 13,472
FSp = {3,6,8}, Pp = 13,572
FSr = {3, 7, 8, 17}, Pr = 16,523
FScp = {3,7,8,19}, Pcp = 15,999
FSrp= [1,7,8,17}, Prp = 16,844
FSrc = {3, 7, 8, 20}, Prc = 15,639
FSrpc = {3, 7, 8, 19}, Prpc = 15,999
Now, by establishing a set union from the results, we have clearly identified
the most preferential candidates to provide the optimal solution {1, 3, 4, 6, 7,
8, 13, 17, 19, 20}. An application of the optimal solution algorithm search
within the resulting set will now require an exploration of the magnitude of
21° instead of 220 .
The PC/AT computer that was used in this experiment was able to arrive
at the correct result in 20 minutes as opposed to the original search time of 48
hours. (It is important to note that the same optimal solution was found in
both cases).
In an informal regime of experimentation, we found that, with one
exception, the derivative results of this methodology were consistently correct
and reproducible. However, the one exception suggests that more thorough
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and formal experimentation and data analysis is called for before the
methodology can be unconditionally adopted.
F. DISCUSSION
A process of link enhancement and a detailed analysis of its potential,
when applied to almost any existing communications network, would
unquestionably add to its potential of survivability. The end product of the
enhancement can be seen as a two-fold phenomenon. The first result may be
an enlargement of an analytical understanding of the expansion capacity of
any given system. The second could well create a number of additional
configurations which, when added to the original plane of the network,
produce significantly greater routability and connectivity.
Since link enhancement is accomplished through physical installation,
and installation assumes not only original costs but also continuing
maintenance, it must be evaluated in regard to its practical achievement by a
set of economic criteria. To date, the optimal solution, achieved through
means of an exhaustive search, in whatever the format of its application, is
the only known method of identifying the specific link enhancement strategy
that can yield the optimal product for a given investment.
The optimal solution exhaustive search method applied in an
unmodified format is a rather unwieldy device. Its consumption of time and
budgetary allocations are substantive enough that employment of the method
to find economic utility in link enhancement becomes especially important
in that the greater the measure of time required to establish possible
configurations of link enhancement, the lower the responsive capacity of a
given system to reconfigure or reconstruct in the event of tactical emergency.
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The above considerations have led us to seek to construct or develop the
methodological improvement presented in the body of this chapter. The
results of our efforts could be most briefly summarized by simply asserting
that the process of link enhancement can be greatly economized in regard to
both money and time if the BGH is used in a format of limited search, and the
process apparently results in the same solution as would otherwise be
achieved with an unmodified exhaustive search.
Though much more thorough testing will be required to refine and
qualify the application of the approach, it appears that the theory of the
improved method and its tentative results, contain the potential for
significant progress in practical applications of link enhancement.
We have thus far considered two approaches to connectivity analysis and
a process of link enhancement as a practical improvement affecting the
application of connectivity evaluation. We shall now seek to enlarge the set
and perspective of identifiable components directly pertinent to the
parameters and objectives of survivability.
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IV. THE SURVIVABILITY APPROACH OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
ARMY'S TACTICAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK
In the preceding chapters we have presented and discussed two
theoretical models for measuring systemic connectivity, and a means of
enhancement that essentially equate connectivity with the survivability of a
given system. In this chapter we shall offer a detailed description of a system
which has been derived from experiential usage (rather than a purely
theoretical model) and which is specifically adapted to a known set of
environmental factors.
Through empirical observation and innate knowledge of the given
parameters of the operational theater, the designers of this system have
chosen not to focus on an abstract measure of connectivity as the chief
determinant of their system design. Rather, they have developed an
approach to the objective of survivability that is focused on the dynamic
responsivity of the system.
Time and accurate data input are always the twin demons facing
engineers as they struggle with network configuration and re-configuration.
SACS (the Saudi Arabian Communication System) has been designed to
squarely address these critical and problematic issues through the structural
placement of features which make the system essentially self-organizing.
Saudi Arabia is currently in the process of replacing their traditional
Army multichannel network with SACS. The new system integrates the
functions of transmission, switching, control, COMSEC, and terminal
equipment (both voice and data) into one system. This provides the user
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with a switched telecommunications network that is extended through the
use of mobile radio telephones and wire access.
The basic architecture of SACS has been designed to effectively support
the communication needs of a division [Ref. 9:p. 27].
In addition to the feature of self-organization, we shall also discuss
flexibility/adaptability and ECCM capabilities as structural components of
SACS.
A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Based on the nominal range of the radio relay equipment and of the
mobile subscriber radio terminals, the system [Ref. 8:p. 20] is comprised of
four trunk nodes and eight radio access centers (RACs) which provide service
for all fixed and mobile subscribers within the brigade area. Additionally, two
more trunk nodes as well as two more radio access centers are held in reserve
to augment network flexibility and ease of reconfiguration in the event that
their additional capacity is required. Figure 3-1 shows the system network
which ensures that 100% of the area is within 25 km of at least one trunk
node. Therefore, the system provides 100% connectivity to the wire users in
all the command posts of the brigade, and all mobile subscribers are within
range of at least one radio access center. More than 50% of these mobile
subscribers are within range of at least two radio access centers, thus greatly
increasing the potential of survivability.
The primary equipment components used in the construction of the
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Figure 3-1. Brigade Area Coverage
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coverage, wire subscriber access, mobile subscriber access, subscriber terminals,
external network access and system control. (An overview of the
relationships among these functions is summarized in Section B.)
1. SACS Area Coverage Function
The area of functional coverage is comprised of, and its limits defined
by, two types of tactical elements: the trunk node (TN) and the radio access
center (RAC). At the trunk node location are a trunk node switch and six
line-of-sight (LOS) assemblages. Each radio access center is composed of one
radio access unit (RAU) and one LOS assemblage, although one radio access
center is normally colocated with each of the trunk nodes of the system, as
shown in Figure 3-2. The primary features of the trunk node switch (TNS)
are as follows:
• Automatic processing of affiliation/ reaffiliation of mobile and wire
users.
• Called subscriber searched through flood search technique.
• Twelve encrypted digital transmission groups operating at 512 kbps.
• Dial-up interface to the SCC. The radio access unit is enhanced by a
switching device which provides the RAU with a stand-alone
capability. Each RAU provides eight full-duplex, 16 kbps digital
interfaces between the network and up to 20 mobile subscribers and
operates in the whole VHF military band (30-38 kHz) using a high/low
band concept for optimum performance.
2. SACS Wire Subscriber Access
Access to the area system for wire subscribers at the headquarters is
provided by the large extension node, which comprises an extension switch
and LOS assemblage. The latter allows the large extension node (LEN) to







LEN - Large Extension Node
SEN - Small Extension Node
SCC - System Central Control * - active ** - standby
Figure 3-2. SACS Area Coverage Configuration
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Access to the area system for wire subscribers at the battalion
command post is provided by the small extension node (SEN), which is
comprised of an extension switch and an LOS assemblage. Since the SEN is
normally connected to the system backbone through one LOS link, another
LOS terminal remains available and may be utilized as a flexible component
(for instance, to establish a connection with a combat net radio interface).
Both the LEN and SEN switches are capable of processing tandem calls, thus
greatly increasing the overall survivability of the network.
3. SACS Mobile Subscriber Access
The mobile subscriber accession function is implemented through
the use of a mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT). MSRT is an
automatic radio set which provides for a total integration of the mobile user
into the SACS network. Figure 3-3 shows a different mode of operation of
which MSRT is capable. Some of the key features of MSRT are:
• Automatic affiliation through whichever REC offers best transmission
path.
• Automatic selection of an interference-free channel among the
available frequency plan.
• Automatic power/receiver sensitivity adjustments to minimize enemy
detection and interference.
• Full-duplex, 16 kbps digital link to the MSRT's parent RAC.
• Direct MSRT-to-MSRT call capability to other MSRTs within radio
range.
4. SACS Subscriber Terminals Function
SACS incorporates various types of user terminals in order to
provide voice, data and facsimile services. For enhanced survivability, the












7-Frequency plan over-lhe-alr transmission
Figure 3-3. Mobile Subscriber A ccess Function
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5. SACS External Network Access Function
A structural provision for interoperability between the system and
other communication systems has been built into SACS. The external
network access function is comprised of two types of tactical elements:
combat net radio interface (CNRI) and the strategic and public network
interface (SPNI).
The combat net radio interface is normally colocated with a small
extension node, with which it may be connected via a fiber-optic cable. CNRI
can interface with one or several types of combat net radios operating in
different bands (VHF, HF, UHF).
The strategic and public network interface is composed of one
external network interface unit and one LOS assemblage. The LOS
assemblage allows us to install an element where an interface points to the
availability of either a strategic or public network and subsequently establish a
link between the external system and the nearest trunk node.
The SPNI switch is configured to support eight individual interfaces,
which can be connected to any compatible network in any combination.
6. SACS System Control Function
The system control center (SCO is the heart of the self-organizing
SACS system and enables the signal commander to manage and control the
communication assets that make up the system. The SACS has two system
control centers (SCC), one in continuous activation and another preserved in
a status of standby readiness, thereby insuring maximum survivability of the
network control function. The SCC enables the signal commander to plan,
3
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reconfigure, and monitor the operations of the other functional areas of the
SACS.
The SCC has the following operating features:
• Automatic planning and direction of the SACS network configuration
and reconfiguration, including:
•• Area network activation, deactivation, and reconfiguration.
•• Transmission link activation and deactivation.
• Automatic frequency management of LOS radio terminals.
• Equipment status follow-up.
• COMSEC key management [Ref. 9:p. 77] for data security.
• Frequency coordination of RF frequencies used by both the mobile
radio access subsystem and the combat net radio interface subsystem.
• Automatic dial-up interface to all the elements of the system.
B. THE SYSTEM'S FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The relationships between the six functional areas of SACS [Ref. 8:p. 59]
are shown in Figure 3-4. This figure illustrates the vital ability of the SACS
system in terms of network reconfiguration capabilities.
• The large extension nodes and the small extension nodes are normally
connected to the trunk nodes, but in case of emergency, they can be
connected to the radio access centers, significantly extending the
coverage of the area network.
• The tactical elements that constitute the external network access
function can be connected to virtually any other element of the
network.
• The system control function has direct access to all the elements of the
network, thus making it possible for the signal commander to directly
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Figure 3-4. SACS Functional Area Relationships
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C SACS SURVIVABILITY
The SACS network has been designed to extend the concept of
survivability to include the capability to continue its function in an intensely
hostile environment without suffering a significant disruption of service.






a. Network Configuration and Reconfiguration
The tasks of network planning and engineering are more often
than not inordinately time consuming, and consequently have a dramatic
effect on network configuration and reconfiguration. The SACS system,
through the structural emplacement of inherent capabilities, as shown in
Figure 3-5, provides for dynamically self-organizing operation, thus
considerably reducing the effect that planning and engineering tasks would
otherwise have.
• The use of fixed directory numbers not only makes it easy for the SACS
subscribers to place calls but also eliminates the need for maintaining
directory tables in each switch of the network.
• The subscriber database contains the directory number of each
subscriber of the network along with its classmark profile, which
defines the services to which a subscriber can gain access. The entire
subscriber database is contained in all the switches of the network and
is automatically updated in case of displacement of a subscriber, thus

































RAC WITHIN RADIO RANGE
Figure 3-5. SACS System Self-Organization
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Automatic affiliation of wire subscribers as well as mobile subscribers is
a key ingredient in making the system self-organizing [Ref. 8:p. 71].
This operation logs the subscriber into the network, assigns the
appropriate classmarks for basic telephone services and
makes the system aware of his location until he moves. A wire
subscriber or CNR subscriber must affiliate each time he connects to the
network and disaffiliate when he leaves the network. However, if he
neglects to disaffiliate when he leaves the network, the system
automatically updates the subscriber database when he reaffiliates with
the network. A mobile subscriber using an MSRT is only required to
activate his radio set upon power up. His equipment automatically
affiliates and reaffiliates when he moves from the coverage area of one
RAC to another.
Flood search is the means by which the system determines a route
between a calling and a called subscriber, regardless of network traffic,
jammed transmission links or inoperable switches. In addition to
considerably increasing the survivability of the network, this technique
eliminates the need for maintaining routing tables as would be the case
with the deterministic routing technique which is used in most
networks.
All network engineering functions are performed at the SCC which
provides the computer-assisted tools required for:
automated planning of the deployment of the network
automatic network activation and deactivation
automatic frequency management of the transmission links
equipment status follow-up
COMSEC management
radio subsystem frequency management
automatic updating of the switch databases
These capabilities enable the Signal Commander to efficiency plan, configure
and monitor the operations of the network.
b. Call Routing
All the subscribers of the SACS system, whether fixed or mobile,
can initiate and receive traffic on a discrete address basis, i.e. a subscriber can
initiate a call knowing only the desired party's directory number. Within the
47
SACS system, the calling subscriber needs only to dial seven digits plus an
optional precedence digit to initiate a call. For calls to the Saudi Strategic and
Public Networks, up to 13 digits can be dialed, depending upon the exact
characteristics of the called subscriber's location.
If the directory number of the called party is found in the database
of the switching equipment servicing the calling subscriber, it is a local call.
The call is then automatically routed to the desired party and is established
based upon the classmarks of both the calling and called parties. The called
subscriber is preempted if necessary, depending upon the precedence level
dialed by the calling subscriber.
If the directory number of the called party is not found in the
database of the switching equipment servicing the calling subscriber, a flood
search is initiated to locate the called subscriber. Figure 3-6 depicts the phases
involved in routing a call through the SACS system:
• Search Phase. The switching equipment servicing the calling
subscriber (switch A) first broadcasts a search message to all connected
switches of the network. Each switch receiving this message (switches
B and C) examines its subscriber database for the called directory
number. If the called party is affiliated at that switch, the switch
immediately initiates the return phase described below. If the called
party is not affiliated at that switch, the search message is forwarded to
all other connected switches (D, E, F ...). During this phase, each switch
keeps track of the transmission link over which the first search
message was received.
• Return Phase. The terminating switch (switch I) where the called party
is affiliated sends a return message back toward the originating switch
over the marked routing path (switches H, G, C), as shown in Figure
3-6b. This message reserves a channel on each traversed transmission
link for further call setup, based on the precedence level of the call
contained in the search message.
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a- Search phase A \^
b - Return phase
c - Call set-up
phase
Figure 3-6. Flood Search Routing
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• Call Setup Phase. Upon receipt of the return message, the originating
switch broadcasts an end-of-routing message to all connected switches
as depicted in Figure 3-6c. This message is progressively forwarded to
all the switches of the network in the same manner as the search
message. Upon receipt of this end-of-routing message, all the switches
not involved in the return phase (B, D, F, J, K, L, E) clear their routing
registers for that call attempt, while the switches involved in the
return phase set up the call via the reserved path.
Restrictions are imposed on the broadcast of search messages to ensure
network-wide traffic regulation, to provide for call precedence during route
selection, and to avoid possible congestion of the switching equipment of the
network.
In addition, the flood search function is programmed to
automatically route calls around any blocked links or incidences of partial
network destruction, providing for dynamic reconfiguration of the system.
Figure 3-7 is a network diagram depicting automatic routing around blocked
links and a destroyed node. Under normal circumstances, the call would be
routed from the originating switch (A) to the terminating switch (B) via the
shortest path (dashed line route through switch C). However, to avoid the
jammed radio link, the link unavailable at the precedence level of the call,
and the destroyed switch C, the flood search automatically selects an alternate
path (solid line) to the terminating switch.
2. Flexibility/Adaptability
The system possesses both the ability to be easily and securely
reconfigured, in order to respond to rapidly evolving tactical situations, and
the ability to interface with many other communications systems.
• The complete identity of all the transmission links of the system, as
well as the actual configuration of the switching equipment included
in all the assemblages, makes it possible to connect the various















Figure 3-7. Automatic Alternate Routing
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• Two trunk nodes, two radio access centers and six LOS assemblages are
usually kept in reserve to face critical or unexpected situations, greatly
enhancing the overall flexibility of the system.
• Reconfigurations of the network must always be engineered by the
System Control Center in order to ensure that the overall performance
of the rest of the network is not degraded as a result of these
reconfigurations. The SCC is responsive to this requirement since it is
capable of directing the relocation of the required assets, engineering
the corresponding transmission links, and transmitting the related
orders to the appropriate elements while still guaranteeing the proper
operation of the unaffected portion of the network.
• All LOS assemblages are fully identical and operate in a unique
frequency band, thus authorizing the SCC to order any node to use an
LOS assemblage from another node whenever dictated by a prevailing
tactical situation.
• The system provides dedicated interfaces to the Saudi Strategic and
Public networks as well as to the Combat Net Radios used at lower
echelons. Furthermore, these interfaces are provided by stand-alone
assemblages which can be connected to any other element of the
network, therefore making it possible to establish the required links.
3. ECCM Capabilities
In order to provide a high level of resistance to an enemy's ability to
detect or jam SACS functions, the RF subsystems have strategically
incorporated numerous ECCM features which add a significant dimension to
the overall survivability of SACS.
The VHF radios of the Mobile Subscriber Access subsystem have a
number of antijam features [Ref. 8:p. 107]:
• The VHF radios use a "programmable" frequency plan consisting of up
to 96 duplex channels. Each channel is made up of one "high-band"
frequency and one "low-band" frequency. The high-band frequency
may be selected anywhere in the 59-88 MHz range and the low-band
frequency may be selected anywhere between 30 and 51 MHz.
Since any channel may be used by the radio to set up a call, an enemy
jammer cannot predesignate a limited VHF band segment as that
which is to be jammed, because the radio will automatically avoid the
jammed channels upon call setup. In addition, even if all the channels
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of the current frequency plan are identified by an enemy intercept
receiver, the Signal Commander may request the activation of a new
frequency plan which will automatically neutralize the enemy
endeavor.
The "marker," continuously transmitted by a radio access center to
allow the mobile subscribers to automatically check their affiliation
state and to initiate a call to a subscriber of the network, is transmitted
on a very slow frequency hopping channel. This channel changes
every time a call is placed by a mobile subscriber, or in the absence of
radio traffic, every 20 seconds. Consequently, it is difficult for the
enemy to locate an RAC based on this signal.
Operation of the entire Mobile Subscriber Access is based on extensive
frequency reuse, since the same frequency plan is used throughout the
brigade area of operation. Because of this unique characteristic, an
enemy direction finding system will often be ineffective in that its
directional measurements will be distorted by the simultaneous
reception of several signals. Furthermore, the enemy will not be
capable of selectively jamming certain communications established
within the SACS system because any frequency of the currently active
frequency plan may be used at a given time by any subscriber.
If a mobile subscriber radio terminal does not receive the marker
transmitted by its parent radio access center for a certain period of time,
for instance in case of jamming of the RAC, it automatically attempts
to reaffiliate with another RAC.
In normal operation of the radio protocol, the excess signal level of the
receivers is assessed at each end of the link during the call-initiation
process. The RF power and receiver sensitivity are then adjusted to
distribute the excess signal margin between the transmitter and
receiver in each link direction. Thus, the receiver is desensitized to an
interfering transmitter to some degree, and the transmitted signal is
lowered to reduce the probability of interception of that call and to
provide more opportunity for frequency reuse.
The VHF radio of the mobile subscriber access subsystem uses link
encryption during both the signaling and the traffic phases. This, along
with the process of selecting an unused RF channel, means that a
jammer cannot track only the most important calls and jam them. It
must assume that all calls are equally important and, thus, is forced to
jam targets of opportunity.
Last, the process of discovering the channels currently in use is made
more difficult for the enemy intercept receiver, because the radios of
the mobile subscriber access subsystem operate in the same band as that
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of the combat net radios deployed over the same area of operation.
Thus, a jamming system would have some difficulty in concentrating
jammer resources in a knowledgeable way on the SACS system alone.
The radio relay terminals also provide a number of antijam features.
• The highly directional antennas of the LOS subsystem have significant
antijam protection (approximately 25 dB peak to sidelobe or backlobe
ratio) against jamming. Additionally, the same level of protection is
provided against intercept and direction-finding receivers operating in
the sidelobe or backlobe direction.
• The UHF radios of the LOS subsystem operate in a full-duplex F1/F2
mode, with no fixed relationship between Fi and F2. Thus, even if a
directional antenna is used by the enemy to locate the radio
transmitting at Fi, this information can neither be used to jam the F2
frequency at the same location nor to obtain knowledge of the location
of the receiver operating at Fi so as to focus the jammer power toward
this receiver.
• When contact is first established between two LOS assemblages during
the opening of a new radio link, both terminals transmit at full power.
When operating in the automatic mode, they then start to adjust the
transmitted power by 5 dB increments until a 15 dB margin above the
threshold guaranteeing a bit error rate of 10-4 , is reached. This margin
will provide adequate protection against statistical fadings while
significantly diminishing the probability that an intercept receiver can
find the transmitted signal.
• It is also possible to use a spread-spectrum transmission mode to
further reduce the probability of interception of the transmitted signal.
In this case, the transmitted signal is combined with a fast pseudo-
random sequence (about 10 Mbit/second) in order to spread the
transmitted spectrum and to reduce the peak power level. Although
this technique reduces the receiver sensitivity by about 3 dB, it greatly
increases the protection of the transmitting radio terminal, both in
terms of detection of the transmitted signal and determination of the
transmitter's location.
D. DISCUSSION
An analysis of the architecture and systems operations of SACS clearly
suggests that survivability was considered as an equal co-function in all of the
operations objectives that its designers envisioned.
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In SACS' approach to survivability, the structural connectivity of the
network may appear to be proportionally stronger in the function of area
coverage than it is in the access function. Though this view could be
supported by mathematical analysis, it is somewhat misleading since the
measure of connectivity of the access area is a function of a capacity whereby
the greater the number of users, the better the overall connectivity of the
access area, as seen in Figure 3-2.
Furthermore, since systemic connectivity is supported by the routing
algorithm and flood search technology in all switching functions, the
processing performance of the entire system is greatly enhanced.
Through the utilization of a modular design concept, the capacity to
establish clear identification of all the transmission links, and the capabilities
of the switching equipment, a systemic capability has been created by which it
becomes possible to connect the constituent elements together into virtually
any configuration. The issue of connectivity is thus transposed to a plane
where it can only be fully appreciated as a function of almost limitless
dynamic responses.
In a system such as SACS which is fully automated, computer-driven,
and self-organizing, there is always a danger that the hardware, once
maximally operational under conditions of great stress, will exceed the
capabilities of its human operators and so negate its effectiveness. The SACS
system significantly reduces the danger of this type of result through the
pivotal position that the system control center occupies. The system has been
designed so that the signal commander can monitor the entire network, and
has complete access to the system's data as well as the capability to modify any
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functions of self-organization in order to comply with a changing set of
strategic objectives.
Any discussion of the survivability profile of SACS would be derelict if it
failed to mention the considerable ECCM capability that the system possesses.
Suffice it to say that the array of anti-jam features incorporated into the
system makes it essentially impregnable within the parameters of today's
available technology.
The empirical approach that SACS has taken towards survivability can
best be summarized by stating the following: saturation of the system with
extraordinary levels of redundancy in function, plus a synthetic capability for
unlimited configuration, allows the system to operate in a mode closely
resembling the organic rather than the mechanistic.
We will now attempt to identify and establish the interrelationship of
those elements within SACS with regard to their contribution to
survivability theory.
A quantitative analysis would of course be preferable, but lacking the
means of accomplishing that at this point in time, we shall endeavor to
suggest the fields of interrelationship with discoursive and deductive logic. It
is our hope that the effort will assist in establishing the relevant sets for the
components of survivability, which in turn may prove useful in creating a
field of focus, or parameter guidelines, for later refinement and
quantification.
We will begin at the level of the fundamental by asking what is the most
essential element among the numerous features which directly contribute to
56
SACS' survivability, or in other words, which element has been assumed to
enable the functions of the rest of the system? Does such an element exist?
The fact of connectivity (used here in its most basic sense of representing
the sum of electronic connections within a system) in its broadest application
can be said to be the precursive assumption of any and all communications
networks dependent upon electronic means to accomplish their goals, since
electronic systems depend upon electronic connections to establish a method
of systemic operability. Connectivity, or the function of interconnections,
though it is a given qualifier of the macro set to which the subset of the
contents that this thesis addresses (survivability), does not necessarily
translate as the precursive element of the survivability itself. We have in fact
stated, in both the introduction and discussion of the SACS data presentation,
that the system does not focus upon connectivity per se as the organizing
principle of its design objectives. Beyond the function of macro set
qualification that connectivity provides, connectivity as a feature within
SACS may be characterized as a factor controlled by means of a modular
design approach, thereby necessitating a systemic organization into discrete
"packets" which are both redundant, hence expendable and easily managed.
Connectivity as an integral feature in SACS design may then be said to be a
controlled factor rather than the specific precursive element.
We have previously identified the feature of self-organization, directed
towards an objective of rapid reconfiguration capability, as being the principle
design objective of SACS. We have characterized this feature by the use of
the term "responsivity." The feature or capability of responsivity, including
all its subfeatures such as SCC, has been developed within a specific context of
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criteria, that while of great importance to the objectives of the system design,
are more accurately qualified as an enhancement of capability rather than a
precursive element.
Through a process of elimination we have arrived at ECCM capability.
We will now change modes to the assertive. ECCM has developed as a
response to empirical observation, which may be summarized by the
following: since electronic components and their subsequent functions
(transmission, reception, linkage, etc.) must be receptive to electronic
impulses and interface to accomplish their ends, they are also subject to being
acted upon through the same means by parties other than originally
intended, that is, an enemy.
If an adversary were able to penetrate the parameters of SACS interior
functions and disrupt it, then the design, content, and capabilities of its
interior features would be compromised in exact proportion to the extent of
penetration and disruption. Since the means of ECCM capability is the
directly proportional qualifier to any and all functions of internal capability,
ECCM capability is the precursive element.
We have previously noted the extensive array of ECCM capability that
SACS deploys: neither expense or effort has apparently been spared. This
leads us to an important qualification of ECCM capability in its function as the
precursive element. Since electronic technology is an area in which
innovation is constant and theoretical models are the collective property of a
world scientific community, ECCM capability is inferred to incorporate the
most progressive features of available technology in order to sufficiently
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fulfill its functions within the schema of high-tech communications
networks.
Having identified the precursive element, we may now posit the
following: E represents ECCM capability, relative to state-of-the-art
technology, acting as a proportional qualifier on the set of interior functions
of a communications network, here represented as X since it is as yet
unqualified, and S represents survivability:
(E)-(X) = S.
We will now attempt to identify and qualify the features contained within X.
As X represents the interior functions of a communications system, it must
include a measure of the functions of connectivity, since the method of
achieving interconnections within a system is an application of connectivity
in its capacity as the macro set precursive. Furthermore, the approach to
achieving and maintaining the connectivity of a system defines the options
and character of its internal organization.
The effect of connectivity approach in its function of defining internal
organization is quite clearly exemplified within SACS. As a response and
method of controlling the problems associated with a viable measure of
systemic connectivity, the SACS system has been organized as a series of sub-
divided modules. Connectivity is established within each module, and the
modules are then, in turn, integrated into the whole of the system, affecting
and defining the entire character of internal systemic organization.
We may then assert that among whatever other features X contains, it
also contains C, where C represents both the measure and approach to
systemic connectivity, or:
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(E) • (X,C) = S.
Moving toward further qualification of the contents of (X,C), we may note
that the entire internal organization of the SACS system has been designed to
achieve an objective of rapid reconfiguration capability. This is largely due to
the defensive vulnerability of Saudi Arabia. Given that Saudi Arabia's
potential adversaries are either numerically superior (such as Iraq or Iran) or
possess greater offensive capacity (such as Israel or the USSR), the posture of
SACS has been to assume the "worst case" scenario. If an enemy has the
capacity to initially inundate the theater of operations with offensive
weaponry, the communications network must have a dynamic capacity for
rapid reconfiguration or it will prove deficient through the attrition of its
physical apparatus. The ability of the network to reconfigure relative to a
field of time is thus clearly an essential feature of its internal design, using the
criterion of survivability. SACS strives to achieve this objective by means of
systemic self-organization, since self-organization represents the most
effective means of optimal reconfiguration within the least amount of time.
We may then assert that as R represents the capability of reconfiguration
in a time field accomplished by means of dynamic self-organization:
(£)• (X,R,C) = S.
Since R and C are interdependent functions within SACS, each structurally
reflective and assumptive of the other function, a clearer representation of
their interrelationship would be achieved by positing the assertion as:
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Furthermore, since at this point all other features within SACS can be
accounted for as subordinate to those we have thus far identified, X may be




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The increasing complexity of military networks dictates that survivability
considerations such as those introduced in this thesis be made an integral part
of the communication network design process, rather than an application to
be added after satisfying operational and organizational requirements. The
exponential growth in the lethality of weaponry that has occurred since
World War I, e.g., mobile artillery, aircraft, guided missiles, etc., has been
compounded by the simultaneous appearance and function of greatly
increased mobility. The effect of these two factors has meant a dramatically
heightened potential for the concentration of destruction in both time and
space.
If a campaign or a battle is to be determined by processes other than the
random interaction of opposing lethal forces, which has often been the case
throughout the history of warfare, an effective command and control
apparatus must be in place and employed. A communications network is the
physical extension of command and control. The survivability of that
communications network in the face of intense lethality and the factor of
mobility is the ultimate determinant of the effectiveness of command and
control.
The connectivity approach quantifies the profile of survivability by four
parameters: the factors of node connectivity and link connectivity (NCF) as
global measures (LCF), and the node decomposition index (NDI) and link tree
index as local measures. These parameters provide the theoretical basis from
which network design proceeds, as well as a continuing means of network
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effectiveness evaluation and configuration expansion. The practical
application of these theoretical assumptions, however, has encountered
numerous difficulties when confronted with operational requirements.
An additional and recurrent problem occurs as the number of nodes in
the network grows larger. The process employed to decompose the graph and
determine the total number of spanning trees becomes unwieldy and
ineffective when working with a large quantity of network nodes. As a
consequence, the theoretical parameters of connectivity are therefore now
seen as only being of practical value when applied to networks of relatively
small size.
Though another simplified model of connectivity exists (which we
referred to as the First Approach in the chapter on connectivity), its premises
essentially equate connectivity with the likelihood of maintaining
communication between selected node-pairs. The simplified model avoids
the network decomposition analysis. Because of this critical avoidance (or
oversight) the simplified theory is not adequate as a tool for rigorous design
applications, though it can be highly useful in supplying a cursory overview
of a given system.
Given the problems associated with the application of the theoretical
models of connectivity, a practical approach has developed. This approach is
well illustrated by the features incorporated within SACS. In SACS, the
survivability objective of the system is attained through a design method that
consists of subdividing the system into functional modular arenas. Each
module meets its own connectivity-survivability requirement, and all the
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modules are deployed in a configuration through which they can be fully
integrated to form an overall system.
In a practical modular approach such as SACS, the design begins by
plotting an area course. Resources (nodes, links, etc.) are then embedded to
establish and quantify full connectivity for the entire array of the network's
usage, fixed and mobile. The area coverage is then interfaced through an on-
line control and monitor pivot (SCO which orchestrates the operations of a
system that is otherwise self-organized in its design and technical capacity for
reconfiguration. The capacity of the system for self-organization deserves
considerable attention in and of itself, since such a capability (or lack thereof)
effectively becomes the measure of tactical responsivity in an environment in
which time is an important factor.
Modularity as a precursive and conscious design element not only
reduces the calculations of connectivity down to a workable dimension, but
also allows for a more efficient planning of resources. The SACS system, for
example, exhibits a basal level of connectivity that is higher in its trunk area
than its access area. Access can be reconfigured, and the SACS system makes
ample provision for the likelihood of that eventuality; the trunk area is more
indispensable to the continuing survival of the system's functions.
Whether a system has emanated from a modular design as a controlled
strategic application or simply as a function of encountering the physical
limitations of transmission, all communications networks can be described as
modular. Any given module can be assessed or evaluated in regard to a
quantifiable measure of connectivity. Regardless of whatever shortcomings
presently exist in the application of connectivity theory, one salient feature is
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eminently observable from an application of connectivity theory—nodes do
not contribute equally to systematic connectivity and some nodes are far more
valuable in their systemic contribution than others.
Link enhancement analysis, whether applied in physical form or utilized
as an analytical tool, is a means whereby the relative contribution of nodes
and the resulting links can be more precisely assessed and /or reconfigured in
accordance with their optimal economic contribution to systemic
connectivity. The means of accomplishing this analysis (the exhaustive
search) is unwieldy, costly, and too time-consuming to be effectively
employed within the conditions of high-tech warfare. We have therefore
expended considerable space and effort to refine an application of link
enhancement analysis that would allow for the utilization of its results
within a reasonable computation time.
Another extremely important component of a realistic survivability
profile is the ECCM capabilities of a system. Note that all features of a system,
such as connectivity, adaptability, self-organization, etc., are essentially
qualified by its ECCM capabilities, since penetration and disruption can render
a system's potential functions inoperable and thus irrelevant. In the SACS
system we have seen the proportionate concentration of resources that results
when ECCM capabilities are clearly identified as a qualifying prerequisite to
systemic design objectives.
A summary of our thesis is as follows. In our introduction, Chapter I, we
provided a rationale for our study into the question of survivability as a factor
in communications networks that defines survivability as an important
65
element in the capacity to implement the strategic functions of command and
control.
Chapter II presented two theoretical models of connectivity in rigorous
detail and discussed the problems associated with their application. The First
Approach was found to be too simplistic a model to be sufficiently
empowered as an effective design mechanism, and the Second Approach
proved too unwieldy to be readily applied.
In Chapter III we presented a method of link enhancement analysis
accomplished through the means of the optimal solution algorithm, an
important practical application in regard to maximizing profit in economic
contribution to systemic connectivity. We also introduced an improved
methodology for utilizing the results of the optimal solution algorithm, based
upon a method wherein BGH results are applied in a limited range of
preferred candidates.
In Chapter IV we presented an overview and analysis of the SACS
system. Of special interest to its contribution to understanding the issue of
survivability were SACS' features of self-organization as a means of
achieving highly responsive automatic reconfiguration in a time-space field
of intense hostility, and its extensive array of ECCM capability.
We now summarize the recommendations that may be useful for further
research.
• In our study we notice that a quantification of connectivity alone is not
an adequate measure of survivability. A more realistic view of
survivability might include the following relationship of components.
Where C represents connectivity both in measure and approach, R
represents the capability of reconfiguration in a time field,
accomplished through means of dynamic self-organization, E
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represents ECCM capabilities relative to state of the art technology and
S represents survival,
The equation is not intended to establish or assert a hardened
definition, but simply to suggest a more realistic way of looking at the
relationship between the components of survivability. Or, at least, it
initiates a more productive line of analysis that draws upon empirical
observation of emplaced systems as much as it does from theoretical
models.
Our second recommendation is that the suggestions for an improved
methodology in utilizing the optimal solution algorithm, which was
introduced in our chapter on link enhancement, be more thoroughly
and rigorously tested on the appropriate equipment.
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